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Immigration Policy in the European Community 
 
Dr. Stephen J.H. Dearden 
 
Migration has become a major global phenomenon in recent decades. As well as permanent 
migrants and their families there are seasonal and temporary workers, frontier workers, illegal 
immigrants and asylum-seekers. In Africa the traditional movement of traders and seasonal 
workers has been obscured by the large number of refugees from political conflict. In Asia 
there has been temporary migration from the Indian subcontinent to meet the labour shortages 
of the Middle East. In Europe the long established migration patterns from ex-colonies to the 
UK and France, and of Turks to Germany, has been supplemented by new flows into the 
traditional countries of emigration such as Italy, Spain and Portugal. At the same time the 
political changes in Central and Eastern Europe have created new and substantial immigration 
pressures upon the Community. 
 
For the developing countries, from which these immigrants principally come, these outflows 
usually offer significant economic advantages. Faced with high rates of population growth 
and limited employment creation immigration offers a safety valve. Remittances can be a 
significant source of foreign exchange, while returning migrants may bring capital and skills 
to foster economic growth. Only the loss of any scarce skilled and qualified labour may 
inhibit their economic development. From a global perspective economic analysis would see 
such movements of labour as yielding the same global welfare maximisation that arises from 
the free movement of capital and of free trade. However immigration is determined not just 
by economic forces but also by political decision making. It is the receiving countries whose 
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immigration policies determine the scale of immigration flows and therefore it is their 
national economic evaluation of the costs and benefits that is central to understanding this 
phenomenon. The intention of this paper is to bring economic welfare analysis to bear on this 
issue from the narrower perspective of these receiving countries. 
 
This analysis will be placed in the context of the EU experience. The establishment of the free 
movement of labour under the Single European Act and the first stages in the creation of a 
borderless Europe under the Schengen agreement have brought to the fore the issue of 
external immigration into the European Union. Inevitably it is being recognised that there is a 
need to establish a common EU immigration policy to replace fragmented and inconsistent 
national regimes. 
 
In the following papers I first describe the changes that took place in national immigration 
policies in the 1970s. In Section 2 I review the trends in immigration into the EU Member 
States over the last few decades and its significance to their economies. The change in 
national policies reflected in part concerns as to the economic consequences of continued 
immigration, in particular its impact upon the receiving countries social infrastructure and 
labour markets. In Section 3 welfare analysis is brought to bear in order to clarify these 
economic arguments. I also review the available studies of the economic impact of 
immigration into the United States. The paper concludes with a review of the progress that 
the EU has made towards the development of a common immigration policy. 
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I. Labour Mobility in the EU 
 
Common labour markets had existed between the UK and Ireland and the Nordic countries 
before the formation of the EU in 1958. Although the original Treaty of Rome under Article 
3(c) had required `the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of 
movement of persons', the process of establishing a common EU labour market did not make 
significant progress until the enactment of the provisions of the Single European Act. In 1992 
this finally created the single European market (SEM). A series of Directives and Regulations 
have sought to remove all obstacles to labour mobility within the EU by outlawing 
discrimination between EU citizens in employment rights, health, social security and housing 
entitlements in any member state. The Commission is also pursuing a programme to establish 
the mutual recognition of both vocational and academic qualifications. Any EU citizen has 
the right to take up employment or establish a business in any member state, and to seek 
employment, accompanied by their dependents, throughout the EU. 
 
Despite the SEM legislative programme the intra-EU movement of labour is expected to 
decline in the coming decades. The principal labour flow in the 1950s and 1960s had been 
from the poorer Southern European states, such as Italy and Spain, to the more prosperous 
Northern countries, eg. Germany and France. However the rising incomes in the Southern 
states has removed much of the incentive to migrate, while the cultural and language 
differences across Europe will always present a significant barrier to migration. By contrast 
the pressure from external migrants for entry into the EU remains substantial and is likely to 
increase. The rate of immigration has been determined solely by the controls imposed by each 
European state. Between 1960 and 1970 the number of foreign workers in nine European 
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countries, increased from 2.5 m. to 5.4 m. The numbers were to peak at 6.3 m. in 1973 and 
then decline to 5.8 m. by 1987 (Hansen 1993). However the number of foreign residents was 
substantially greater and by 1991 it was estimated that 8 million non-EU nationals were 
resident in the Community, 2.5% of the EU's population. By contrast only 5 million EU 
citizens were resident in an EU country other than their own. 
Initially immigration into Europe during the period of post-war reconstruction was of 
`displaced-persons' from Central and Eastern Europe. During the boom years of the 1950s and 
early 1960s European countries actively recruited labour from their ex-colonies or developing 
countries. National immigration policies could be broadly classified as of two types: 
rotational and permanent. Switzerland and West Germany adopted a rotational system of 
immigration controls, where permits were issued for a limited period and could not be 
extended. By contrast the UK operated a system of permanent residency permits. Other 
European countries operated a mixture of these two systems, but no country allowed 
uncontrolled immigration. 
 
By 1973 West German attempts to rotate immigrant labour under the `guestworker' system 
had failed to prevent the emergence of a permanent immigrant community which exceeded 
10% of the workforce; one quarter of which was Turkish. The impact of the 1967-68 
recession and the first oil price shock of 1973-4 provided the trigger for a policy change. 
From November 1973 recruitment of foreign labour and the issue of primary immigration 
permits were ended. At the same time the number of permits for relatives of existing migrants 
were increased; effectively recognising the failure of the rotational system. Although the 
recessions provided the rationale for the tighter immigration controls, the available evidence 
of unemployment rates amongst unskilled workers (approx. 0.1%) suggests other political 
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considerations were of greater importance than the state of the labour market (Hansen 1993). 
 
During the 1970s a similar watershed was passed in many European countries in their attitude 
to immigration. In France the first attempt to tighten the controls on legal and illegal 
employment of foreign labour occurred in January 1972 with the "Fontanet" circular. The 
opposition of employers ensured its suspension in 1973, but legislative controls on 
immigration were significantly tightened by 1974. In Sweden the foreign recruitment of 
labour was halted and immigration permits reduced in 1972. Similarly the Netherlands 
tightened its immigration controls in the late 1970s. The UK had been seeking to reduce `new' 
Commonwealth immigration  since 1962, with the 1971 Immigration Act restricting 
immigration to the dependents of existing immigrants.  
 
As with West Germany the rise in unemployment in the early 70s seems unable to explain 
both the tightening of entry controls and their subsequent maintenance. Political concern at 
the social impact of large and growing non-European immigrant communities may well be 
the crucial factor in explaining these policy changes. However two further economic 
considerations may have contributed to these policy shifts. Firstly, recognition of the strain 
that substantial immigration was placing on the social infrastructure such as housing, 
education, health, and social services, and upon social security budgets. Secondly, pressure 
from trade unions concerned that immigrants would displace their members in employment 
and depress wages. These two issues are analysed in greater detail in Section 3.   
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II. Recent Trends in Immigration 
 
Initially the attempt to curtail immigration in the early 1970s across the EU was largely 
successful. However family reunification and the natural growth of the immigrant 
communities resulted in their continued expansion. Family reunification and the young age 
profile of these communities, has produced a fertility rate significantly higher than that of the 
indigenous population. Thus while the European fertility rate is approximately 1.6 children 
per woman, below the replacement ratio of 2.1, that for example, of Tunisian women resident 
in France was 6.19. In 1992 10% of all births were to parents of foreign origin in Germany, 
Belgium, France and the UK. However over time most immigrant groups would be expected 
to adjust their fertility rates to those of the indigenous European population (OECD 1991). 
 
During the 1980s net migration had equalled the indigenous population growth of the EU 
with the number of foreign residents increasing by nearly 800,000 in Germany, by 500,000 in 
Italy and by 200,000 in the UK and the Netherlands. In France the number of foreign 
residents fell by 130,000 as a result of naturalisations and immigrants returning to their home 
countries. But overall net immigration had been on a downward trend until the last few years 
of the 1980s (Table 1). This reversal has been attributed to four factors; the social upheavals 
in Eastern Europe, an upturn in the inflows of skilled labour, the increase in migration to the 
Southern Member States of the Community and the increase in the number of asylum seekers 
(Table 2). The number of asylum applications increased in Germany from 73,832 in 1985 to 
322,600 in 1993; in France from 25,800 to 27,600 and in the UK from 5,900 to 28,500. The 
total number of refugees resident in the EU in 1988 had reached 1.2 million; with 800,000 in 
Germany, 184,000 in France and 100,000 in the UK.   
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Table 1 
Immigration 
  
'000 
                   1983 1991 1992 1993 
 
Belgium 34.3 54.1 55.1 53 
Denmark  29.2 29.1 20 
France 64.2                      109.9                 116.6 99.2 
Germany                                        273.2 (West)            920.5              1,207.6                  
989.8 
Netherlands 36.4 84.3 83 87.6 
UK 53.5 53.9 52.6 55.5 
 
 
Source : OECD : Trends in International Migration, Annual Report 1994 
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Table 2 
 
Asylum Seekers & Refugees 
 
'000 
 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
 
Belgium  5.3 12.9 15.4 17.6 26.7 14.3 
Denmark  8.7  5.3  4.6 13.9 14.3  6.6 
France 28.9 54.8 47.4 28.0 27.6 26.0 
Germany 73.8     193.1         256.1           438.2         322.0         127.0 
Sweden 14.5    29.4       27.3        84.0           37.5            18.6 
UK   6.2    30.3       57.7       32.0           28.5           41.0 
 
Source : Statistics in Focus 1996, No1, Eurostat 
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By 1993 the total number of non-EU residents in the Community had reached 12 million 
(Table 3). Of these migrants one quarter were Turks, mainly resident in Germany, and another 
quarter from North Africa and resident in France. Germany accounts for 39% of all migrants 
to the EU and France 18%. Relative to their populations Germany again emerges as having 
the highest concentration at 5.9%, with Austria at 5.6%, France at 3.9%, and Belgium, and 
the Netherlands with 3.7%. The significance of migrant labour to the various European 
economies can be seen in Table 4. Again immigration is most significant to the German 
economy, with economically active immigrants providing 7% of Germany's total labour force; 
while in France, the second highest, they total 4%. Belgium, Portugal, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom all fall in the range 2.1% to 2.7% 
 
However these Tables need to be treated with some caution as an indication of the extent of 
immigration to the various Member States of the EU. Each country varies significantly in the 
right to naturalisation and this is reflected in the numbers who are granted national citizenship 
(Table 5). At one extreme is Sweden, where in 1993 42,700 immigrants received citizenship 
through naturalisation (13.6% of the resident foreign population), whereas in Germany 
citizenship was granted to 45,000 (0.9% of the foreign residents). Further complications arise 
from variations in the entitlement to citizenship of the children of foreign nationals resident in 
a country, which is the usual practice in France but not in Germany or Austria, and from the 
entitlements to citizenship of people born abroad (see M. Baldwin Edwards 1991).  Thus the 
UK's estimated non-EU population of 1 million contrasts with the 2.6 million ethnic minority 
population (1991), while Germany has received over one million immigrant ethnic Germans.   
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Table 3 
Non EU Residents 
1993 
 
                           Population % EU  Total 
  ‘000  ‘000 
Austria  445 5.6  3.6 
Belgium  372 3.7  3.0 
Denmark  140 2.7  1.1 
France 2251 3.9 18.5 
Finland   35 0.7  0.2 
Germany 4777 5.9 39.0 
Greece  134 1.3  1.1 
Ireland   21 0.6  0.1 
Italy   740 1.3  6.1 
Netherlands  564 3.7  4.6 
Portugal   89 0.9  0.7 
Spain    19 0.5  1.6 
Sweden  313 3.6  2.6 
UK  1259 2.2 10.3 
 
EU15 12176 3.3 
Source : Statistics in Focus 1996, No2, Eurostat 
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Table 4 
Foreign Employees in the EU 
1994 
 
                         ` 000    % Labour Force 
 
Belgium  105 2.7 
Denmark   32 1.2 
France  926 4.0 
Germany 2514 7.0 
Greece   59 1.4 
Ireland    9 0.6 
Italy   127 0.6 
Netherlands  179 2.6 
Portugal   13 2.7 
Spain      66 0.4 
UK   574 2.1 
 
 
Source : Labour Force Survey 1994, Eurostat 
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 Table 5 
 
 Naturalisations 
 '000 
 
 1986 1990 1991 1992 1993 
 
Germany 13.8 20.0 27.1 36.9 45.0 
France 45.6 54.4 59.6 59.2 60.0 
Sweden 20.7 16.8 27.7 29.4 42.7 
UK 45.5 57.2 56.7 57.8 45.8 
 
EU15 176.7 197.6 237.0 295.7 290.7 
 
 
Source: Statistics in Focus 1996, No2, Eurostat  
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Finally we must recognise that so far I have only discussed the available data for legal 
immigration.  Illegal immigration is also regarded as being significant, especially in the 
Southern Member States of the EU. The EU Commission (ISOPLAN 1989) estimated that in 
1988 Spain had 294,000 illegal residents, Portugal 60,000, Greece 70,000 and Italy 850,800. 
In 1991 Spain decided to regularise the situation of illegal immigrants and received 133,000 
applications. 
 
With the contrasting birth rates of the EU and the surrounding countries of North Africa and 
Asia, and the widening economic gap between these developed and developing areas, 
migration pressure is expected to be substantial in the coming decades. Between 1994 and 
2025 the population of Algeria is expected to increase 91%, Egypt's 67%, Morocco's 76%, 
Tunisia's and Turkey's 56% and Sudan's by 121% (United Nations Population Fund 1994). 
Political change in Eastern and Central Europe, with the threat of economic collapse, has also 
raised the spectre of substantial East - West migration. The International Organisation for 
Migration (1991) has suggested that 5 million migrants will move into the EU by the year 
2000. Germany, Austria, France, Italy and the Benelux countries are seen as the most likely 
recipients of these migrants. If these estimates were to be realised it would represent only an 
increase of 0.3% of these countries' populations. By comparison during the peak years of 
immigration to the US (1900-1910) the inflow was 1.2%. However these estimates remain 
highly uncertain and the actual outcome will be determined by the political decisions of the 
EUs Member States. 
 
III. Analysis 
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Immigration will have an impact both upon the labour market conditions and the public 
finances of a receiving country. It will have implications both for workers and employers in 
the short and long run. Beginning with a global perspective the economic evaluation of 
international immigration focuses upon the gains in allocative efficiency that arise from the 
free movement of factors of production. The efficient world wide utilisation of factors will be 
indicated by the equalisation of goods and factor prices across all economies. Should factor 
prices, reflecting marginal productivities, vary, then a reallocation of factors will allow 
increased production and a gain in global welfare. 
 
A considerable debate has taken place as to whether free trade in goods and the free 
movement of capital are sufficient to achieve global welfare maximisation without the need 
for labour mobility, as suggested in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model (see Straubhaar 
1988). This conclusion is less clear once the simplifying assumptions of this model are 
relaxed. Impediments to free international trade, whether arising from trade barriers or natural 
protection inherent in the nature of the good, and insufficient labour mobility within a 
country, may both require international labour mobility to achieve allocative efficiency. 
Markusen (1983) argues that economies of scale, imperfect competition, taxes and differing 
production technology, will all require labour mobility to complement international trade. 
 
However in this discussion of the welfare effects of international migration it will be assumed 
that labour mobility is essential to achieve allocative efficiency, and will focus upon the 
question of the distribution of the benefits from such migration.1Thus the analysis will be 
confined to the benefits and costs experienced by the receiving country. This is a more 
narrowly focused definition than the global welfare analysis which is usually employed. 
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These distributional aspects are a crucial issue when international labour flows are usually 
constrained by national controls on the right of entry and settlement. Restricting the welfare 
analysis to that of the impact upon a host country will more realistically reflect the policy 
making environment. 
 
In Fig.1, before immigration occurs, the labour demand (Ld) and indigenous labour supply 
(Ls) are in equilibrium at real wage 0a with employment 0g. At this real wage employees are 
receiving a welfare surplus or economic rent of dab. Producers, who are able to pay a uniform 
wage of 0a receive a producers surplus of ajb, the difference between labours marginal 
productivity as represented by the labour demand curve and the uniform wage 0a. 
 
Since the prevailing real wage exceeds the costs of migration a totally elastic supply of 
immigrant labour is available to this economy. Immigration is however limited to the increase 
Ls-Ls2. This lowers the equilibrium wage to 0i and increases total employment to 0f. It is 
assumed that all immigrants are employed. The consequences for the indigenous labour force 
in this common labour market are both a reduction in their wage and a fall employment to 0h. 
The reduction in employment is occurring as the lower wage is now below the reservation 
wage for hg members members of the indigenous labour force. The size of the reduction in 
employment will be determined by the elasticity of the indigenous labour supply. Although 
those who are no longer employed are able to take additional leisure, which in itself yields 
utility, both those who cease employment and those who remain employed will lose aikb of 
labour surplus with the fall in the real wage. By contrast for the employers the producers 
surplus increases from ajb to ije. This increase in welfare would be sufficient for employers to 
compensate labour for its loss of welfare and still gain the area kbe. 
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From this basic analysis we must now consider the relaxation of some of the simplifying 
assumptions and the longer term dynamic effects upon an economy of such migratory flows. 
Consider first the assumption that the economy is functioning at full employment. In an 
economy where real wage levels are not completely flexible, but constrained by a `floor' such 
as that imposed by minimum wage legislation, involuntary unemployment may emerge. In 
Fig.2 we illustrate the extreme case of this argument. Starting from an equilibrium market 
clearing real wage 0a we will now also regard this as the minimum wage. Now migrant 
labour gm can fully displace the indigenous labour force 0g generating a potential maximum 
welfare loss 0abg which is not offset by any gain in producers surplus, which remains ajb. 
Brecher and Choudhri (1987), extending the neoclassical model to include unemployment, 
arrive at the same conclusion that any migration now represents a welfare loss. However 
migrant labour is unlikely to completely displace any indigenous labour force 
 
The availability of social security benefits as a source of alternative income must also be 
considered, since it will provide some residual economic welfare to the involuntarily 
unemployed. Only if it is argued that work yields positive utility to an employee - by 
providing a social structure, work satisfaction etc. - might the welfare loss of involuntary 
unemployment again become substantial. With the indigenous labour forces' reservation wage 
indicated by their labour supply curve the total welfare reduction will only be reflected in the 
loss of consumer surplus adb. 
  
Immigration will also have an impact upon public finances. Tax contributions by immigrants 
will raise government revenues but will be offset by claims upon social security from any 
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unemployed displaced indigenous workers or by the immigrants themselves. However 
immigrants will also be contributing through the tax system to the provision of society's 
collective public goods from their wage income gcef. In the case of pure public goods this 
will represent an unambiguous gain to the welfare of the indigenous population. Many 
collectively provided services offer elements of `public goodness' and economies of scale 
which will again reduce the costs of their provision when spread over a larger population. 
However where capacity is reached in the provision of additional public services substantial 
incremental costs of service provision may arise. This issue is particularly relevant when 
considered in the context of the dependency ratio of any migrant labour force. The social 
costs of immigration will be greater the higher the dependency ratio of any immigrant group 
ie. the greater the proportion of economically inactive dependents in each family. Rotational 
immigration controls minimise this dependency ratio by only permitting the entry of those 
who are economically active. By contrast permanent immigration, with the entry of 
dependents, will impose the greatest social costs. Here the pattern of migration begins with 
young men, followed by wives and then dependent close relatives. High fertility rates in 
immigrant communities also tend to increase the dependency ratio above that of the national 
average, while the age profile will reduce it in the short run. 
  
Simon (1994) has reviewed estimates of the impact upon public finances of immigrants. 
Studies of US, Canadian, Swiss, Swedish and German data suggest that immigrants make a 
net contribution to public finances. But many of the studies fail to take into account all of the 
costs of public service provision, focusing principally upon transfer payments and taxation. 
The net gain in public finances also arises principally as a result of the young age profile of 
immigrants, who therefore minimise their pension cost. However in the long-term any 
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immigrant community will impose the same pension costs as the indigenous population. 
 
We can now turn to the dynamic effects of labour migration. With competitive product 
markets the lower wage costs will be reflected in lower prices. This will result in an increase 
in demand for goods with a consequent rightward shift of the labour demand curve. 
Depending upon the usual elasticity criteria - the price elasticity of demand, the supply 
elasticity of capital, the elasticity of substitution of other factors and the larger the share of 
labour in final costs - the demand for labour and the equilibrium wage rate will increase. Thus 
the welfare loss to the indigenous labour force will be reduced as we return towards the 
original equilibrium wage rate 0a (Fig.3) and the employment of the indigenous labour force 
increases to 0g, with total employment at 0p. Producer surplus has also risen to qra.  
 
But in product markets which are monopolised the fall in the real wage may be diverted to 
higher levels of profit. It is possible that this will result in higher levels of investment by 
firms or consumption by the owners of capital, both types of expenditure increasing the 
demand for the output of the economy and raising the demand for labour, as described above. 
However it is also possible that this increased purchasing power may be dissipated in a higher 
demand for imports. Under these circumstances no expansion of output or increase in demand 
for labour will occur. 
 
Finally we can consider the implications of the possibility that the immigrant labour may be 
entering a segmented labour market. In the extreme case where total segregation is occurring 
and none of the indigenous labour force is willing to take employment in a particular 
occupation, immigrant labour might be regarded as having no displacement effect upon the 
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indigenous labour force. However in the longer term immigrant labour is likely to accumulate 
human capital and raise its expectations such that it will not be confined to a distinct 
unskilled sector. Such complete segmentation of the labour market is also improbable, with 
labour shortages in any particular sector of the economy more likely to arise from the failure 
of wage rates to rise sufficiently to elicit the necessary supply of indigenous labour. Such 
wage rigidity may itself result from the perception of employers that cheaper immigrant 
labour is potentially available, even allowing for any possible higher indirect costs of their 
employment eg. the need for increased supervision. Only one possible case of unambiguous 
welfare gain is likely and that will occur where particular skill shortages exist which can only 
be met by immigrant labour. Such skilled labour will allow an expansion of production and 
the employment of complementary `unskilled' indigenous labour. In Fig.4 there are a 
substantial number of unskilled labourers seeking employment at wage 0t. With the 
expansion of demand for this complementary labour there is a gain in wage payments to those 
newly employed of muxp and in producers surplus of uvyx. This unambiguous welfare gain 
can offset any losses being experienced in the skilled labour market. 
  
But it must also be recognised that any gains from immigration will last only for that period 
during which specific skill shortages continue and until the indigenous labour force may be 
trained. Although the availability of immigrant labour may ameliorate short-run inflationary 
pressures through reducing labour market mismatch (Hansen 1993), it may also inhibit 
economies from undertaking the necessary structural reforms which will be required for 
sustained long-term growth. The OECD (1985) has suggested just such a phenomenon 
occurred in Europe before 1973 where substantial immigration allowed labour market 
rigidities to be sustained. 
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Empirical Studies 
One approach to estimating the impact of immigration is to simulate such changes in an 
economic model. Razin and Sadka (1995), assuming rigid wages, estimated that with 
immigrants representing 10% of the labour force the aggregate consumption of an indigenous 
labour force would be reduced by 3.4%. However the model employed makes some heroic 
assumptions and focuses upon the shift of investment between human and physical capital.  
 
More revealing evidence can be derived from econometric studies which directly attempt to 
estimate the impact of immigration upon the indigenous labour force. This principally 
depends upon the degree to which immigrants and indigenous labour are complements or 
substitutes in the production process. Grossman (1982) estimated that a 10% increase in the 
number of immigrants to the US would reduce employment by 0.8% in the short-run with 
rigid wages, with a fall of 1% in indigenous wages in the long-run. Borjas (1983, 1986) 
suggests that immigrants are complements in production for male indigenous labour but 
substitutes for women. By contrast Bean (1988), in examining the impact of illegal 
immigrants on five Southwestern labour markets, finds no evidence for a negative effect upon 
either indigenous men or women. 
 
However it has been argued that it is the degree of skill that immigrant labour brings to the 
labour market that is, in turn, the crucial determinant of it's complementarity or 
substitutability. Most of the immigration into both the US and EU has been of unskilled or 
semi-skilled labour, which is more likely to be competing with indigenous unskilled labour, 
but may be complementary to skilled indigenous labour. US studies have established, as 
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would be expected, that increased supplies of any type of labour reduces that group's own 
wages (Lalonde & Topel 1991). But Rivera-Batiz & Sechzer (1991), taking into account the 
relative skill characteristics of twenty four immigrant and indigenous labour groups, find only 
a small adverse cross effect. For example, a 10% increase in immigration from Latin America 
reduces white US wages by less than 0.5%. These results are supported in work by Butcher & 
Card (1991), Winegarden & Khor (1991), Borjas (1991) and Friedberg & Hunt (1995).  
 
But recent work by Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1991) has noted the considerable decline in 
the earnings and employment prospects of unskilled labour in the US in recent years. They 
estimated that immigration and trade factors accounted for a fall of 3% to 5% in unskilled 
wages between 1980 and 1988. Chiswick (1991) has raised more fundamental criticisms of 
the empirical approach of many of these studies. Most attempts to estimate the impact of 
immigration on wage rates have utilised cross-State or cross-city data, but Chiswick points 
out that the mobility of immigrant labour will itself ensure that any inter-State or inter-city 
wage differentials are eliminated in the long run. Greenwood and McDowell (1994), in 
reviewing the literature, are also very critical of the assumptions of constant returns to scale, 
competitive markets and immobile capital, underlying many studies. They believe that the 
more narrowly defined the groups affected by immigration or the more recent the data 
employed, the more likely a negative impact seems to emerge. They also observed that 
complementarity is not the only issue in assessing the impact of immigration, but 
consideration also needs to be given to demand effects and the consequences for capital 
accumulation, aspects that are largely unexplored. 
 
European studies of the impact of immigration on the labour market are fewer but broadly 
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support the US conclusions. Although Winkelman and Zimmermann (1993) found that 
immigration had made a significant but small contribution to increasing unemployment in 
Germany in the 1970s, Muhleisen and Zimmermann (1994) found no effect in the 1980s. In 
terms of a wage effect, again it is necessary to distinguish between the impact upon the 
skilled and unskilled indigenous labour force. DeNew and Zimmermann (1994) for example, 
found that immigration appeared to have depressed the wages of unskilled German workers 
but increased the earnings of the skilled workers. Similarly Eckberg (1983) identified a 
negative impact upon the unskilled wage in Sweden in the 1970s, but this was found to be 
small. A comprehensive study by Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994), of both the US and 
European labour markets, attempted to isolate the specific skill characteristics of both 
immigrant groups and the indigenous labour force. Amongst other results they suggested that 
a 1% increase in the labour force arising from Turkish immigration would reduce the wages 
of an average worker in the Netherlands by 0.09%, while German workers would experience 
a 0.01% reduction. Asian immigrants to the UK reduce average UK  wages by 0.08% 
and in France by 0.1%, while North Africans reduce French wages by 0.07%. However the 
authors admit that the available data is not entirely satisfactory and have assumed perfect 
wage flexibility, and hence no unemployment. Finally Zimmermann (1994) found a 
correlation between the proportion of immigrant labour employed in German industries and 
their reliance upon unskilled indigenous labour. These industries also appear to be competing 
with imports and to have low levels of both innovation and R & D. 
 
A recent review article by Zimmermann (1993) concluded that most studies had been unable 
to identify any significant adverse effects. It is therefore suggested that immigrants are usually 
complementary to the indigenous labour force rather than substitutes in the labour market. 
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However any adverse consequences will be experienced mainly by unskilled indigenous 
labour, especially as both groups tend to be concentrated in the same industries. 
 
Although on balance immigration might appear from this work to offer short-run advantages, 
with foreign labour being complementary to the indigenous labour force either through being 
confined to a particular labour market sector or by overcoming skill shortages, it may still 
have adverse long-term consequences, unless the immigration is rotational. Unskilled 
immigrants would be expected to acquire skills over time and would then compete with 
indigenous labour. Alternatively, meeting skill shortages through immigration may reduce 
returns to the indigenous labour force from investing in their human capital and therefore 
delay the long-term adjustment of the economy. In regard to public finances any short-term 
gain from the age profile of immigrants will be offset by long term claims upon that society. 
Thus the inter-generational costs and benefits of permanent immigration raise particular 
problems in evaluating the overall advantages of immigration and bring to the fore the central 
political issue of defining the `indigenous society'. 
 
IV. EU Immigration Policy 
Concerns that the employment of immigrant labour might undermine pay and conditions for 
indigenous labour, and thereby threaten `social cohesion', has formed one element of the more 
general debate about the possibility of `social dumping'. With the establishment of the SEM 
competitive pressures from low-cost producers within the EU, where wages, social security or 
employment conditions are poor, may serve to undermine labour conditions in the more 
advanced EU member states. This is of particular concern to West Germany, the highest 
labour cost economy of the EU The issue is by no means as simple as it might at first appear, 
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since high wage costs may be offset by high labour productivity, and social security benefits 
may be traded-off against wage levels in a labour market with wage flexibility (see Dearden 
1995). Nonetheless the demand for EU wide minimum employment conditions remains 
strong. As part of the Social Action Programme (SAP) designed to realise the principles of 
the Social Charter, Directives have  extended the rights enjoyed by full-time workers to those 
employed under `atypical' contracts (eg. part-timers, those on short-term contracts), minimum 
employment conditions for young workers, and restrictions on working hours. A minimum 
wage has also been proposed for the Community. As part of the SAP the Commission has 
also drafted rules setting minimum employment conditions, including wage levels, for foreign 
workers, whether employed directly or through subcontractors. Such subcontracting is 
particularly important in the construction industry where significant numbers of foreign 
workers have been employed. 
 
But the SEM, with its creation of a common internal labour market, inevitably raises the issue 
of the need for a common immigration policy for the Community. Once within the borders of 
the EU immigrants will face few border checks on their movement across national frontiers.  
The Single European Act of 1986 (SEA) specifically excluded issues affecting the free 
movement of people from the extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) and attached a 
declaration that the SEA would not constrain Member States' rights to take action for the 
purposes of controlling immigration. However a Political Declaration attached to the SEA 
committed the States to co-operation in combating drug trafficking, international crime and 
terrorism and in the control of immigration. But this co-operation was to be 
inter-governmental, excluding the institutions of the Community  including the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). Four developments have so far resulted from this commitment - the 
 25
Schengen Agreement, the Dublin Convention on Asylum, the Convention on External 
Borders and TREVI. 
 
The TREVI group, which preceded the formally independent Ad Hoc Group on Immigration, 
had been formed in 1975. Consisting of EU Interior Ministers, it co-ordinated action against 
terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking. In 1986 its activities had been extended to 
immigration issues. By 1990 an agreement had been signed determining Member State 
responsibilities for processing asylum applications. The TREVI group was also harmonising 
visa application procedures, facilitating the development of a common list of undesirable 
aliens and the exchange of information. Complementing these developments was the 
Schengen Group - Benelux, France, and Germany. Originally signed in 1985 the Schengen 
Accord aims to remove border controls between these countries, but complemented by the 
harmonisation and strengthening of external border controls. The Agreement provides for the 
exchange of information on non-EU nationals through the computerised Schengen 
Information System and the development of a common list of undesirables as defined by each 
States security services. It also involved the establishment of common visa requirements, 
currently covering 127 countries. Non-EU nationals will however be able to travel for up to 
three months within the Schengen group for the purpose of tourism, but with a requirement to 
register their residence. The Schengen Agreement came into force in March 1995 and in 1997 
it was incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam, integrating it into the EU institutions. It 
now covers  all of the EU’s Member States except for the United Kingdom and Ireland. 
 
Considerable difficulties have arisen with both the Convention on External Borders and the 
Dublin Convention. With the Convention on External Borders problems have arisen from the 
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position of Gibraltar, which may now be treated as an EU `colony' and for Denmark, with its 
pre-existing Nordic Labour Agreement. Much of this Convention is comparable to the 
Schengen Agreement, with common lists of undesirable aliens, computer exchange of 
information, carrier sanctions and free movement of non-EU nationals for up to 4 months. 
Meanwhile the Dublin Convention (1990) established that all asylum claims should be 
handled by the first EU State that an applicant enters. Similarly the non-binding London 
Resolution (1992), allowing asylum seekers to be deported to non-EU buffer States without 
right of appeal, has faced the challenge that it may violate the 1951 UN Convention on 
refugees. Again it must be emphasised that all of these agreements are inter-governmental and 
outside of EU jurisdiction. 
 
The limitations of an approach relying on inter-governmental agreements led Chancellor Kohl 
at the Luxembourg summit of 1991 to suggest `Communitisation' of immigration and asylum 
policy. Subsequently the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration suggested three priorities for 
Community policy harmonisation :- 
1. Admission of immigrants for family reunification, employment or humanitarian reasons. 
2. Policy on illegal immigrants and deportation. 
3. Admission of third-country nationals for employment. 
In regard to asylum policy the Group sought the implementation of the Dublin Convention 
and the creation of a mechanism for sharing information about asylum applicants (CIREA 
established in June 1992). 
 
In the face of opposition from some Member States, especially the UK, to an erosion of 
national sovereignty in this area, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1993 recognised 
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two approaches - one based upon inter-governmental agreements, the other Community law. 
Thus under Articles K1.1 to K1.3 asylum policy, rules governing external frontier controls 
and immigration policy, were merely recognised as matters of common interest. In these areas 
Member States and the Commission share the power of initiative. Subject to unanimity the 
Council of Ministers could adopt joint positions, agree joint action or draw up Conventions 
based upon international law for national agreement. Under these arrangements a series of 
Council Resolutions were agreed covering the admission of third-country nationals for 
employment (June 1994), self-employment and for study (November 1994). The Ad Hoc 
Group has also been replaced by the permanent K4 Committee which will also oversee the 
European Information System which covers immigration, asylum security and policing 
policy. 
 
By contrast Art. 100c amended the EU Treaty, and empowered the Council, under 
Community law, to unanimously determine which non-EU nationals will require visas to 
enter the Community; an essential requirement of the free internal labour market. The 
Commission has proposed a list of 129 countries from whom visas will be required, which is 
almost identical to the Schengen list of 127 countries. Further Art. K.9 of the TEU allowed 
the adoption of the procedures of Art.100c to the areas covered by Art. K1. Thus Community 
law could be extended to asylum policy, the control of external borders, foreign entry and 
residence requirements and control of illegal immigration. This was finally realised under the 
Amsterdam Treaty (1997) which ended the distinction between Community law and 
inter-governmental agreements in these areas. The Treaty also incorporates the Schengen 
Agreement which will create a borderless Europe between the 13 Schengen countries. It is 
anticipated that Schengen will also be applied by Norway and Iceland, but the UK and Ireland 
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will continue to operate border controls. 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty retains the right of veto for Member States for at least five years in 
these sensitive areas. Since it will no longer be possible to `tie' immigration permits to any 
single country in a Community that has removed internal border controls, and immigrants are 
likely to be far more mobile than EU citizens within the Community, as they are less inhibited 
by social, linguistic and cultural ties to particular Member States, the focus will be upon the 
overall EU limit. Arriving at such a Community quota may well prove difficult, as 
immigration limits acceptable to one Member State may be unacceptable to others. 
 
The Tampere Council meeting in 1999 illustrated how far immigration policy has emerged as 
an important Community policy issue and how responsibility is shifting from individual 
Member States to the Union. As one of the specific priority areas addressed, the Council 
reiterated the need to develop a common European Asylum System - with clearly defined 
responsibilities amongst Member States, common asylum criteria, minimum standards of 
administration and the establishment of a database of asylum seekers (Eurodac). Further 
impetus was also to be given to the development of common visa requirements and the 
prevention of documentation fraud; with the possibility of the establishment of EU visa 
issuing offices. The Council called for much closer coordination between the border control 
services of the existing Member States and made clear the responsibility of any prospective 
members to adopt similar rigorous controls. The Commission was required to give priority to 
exercising the powers given to it in the Amsterdam Treaty to negotiate readmission 
agreements, or readmission clauses in other agreements, with all relevant countries. These are 
intended to address not only the repatriation of a non-EU country's nationals, but also the 
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readmission of non-nationals into the State in question who have transited into the EU. The 
negotiation of such wide ranging agreements is likely to prove problematic. In the recently 
concluded Lomé negotiations with the Asia, Caribbean and Pacific group of developing 
countries, the EU had proposed requiring such agreements as part of the aid and trade 
Convention. However after considerable controversy these proposals were watered down to 
the consideration of voluntary agreements, without any specified minimum requirements. The 
Convention will only include an enabling Article on illegal immigrants "subject to the 
constraint of international convention and law." 
 
The Council also "acknowledges the need for approximation of national legislations on the 
conditions for admission and residence of third country nationals, based upon a shared 
assessment of the economic and demographic developments within the Union". - ie. the 
creation of a global EU immigration limit. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Economic theory is unable to offer an unambiguous answer to the question as to whether the 
EU member states will experience any net economic gain from continued immigration. At 
best it can indicate the forms of immigration that are most likely to maximise any economic 
advantage. If migrants are meeting a skill shortage or are only temporary, unaccompanied by 
dependents, then a net economic gain to the EU states is more probable. However it has been 
argued that importing skilled labour may offer only a short-run palliative to a skill shortage 
and may inhibit the necessary structural adjustment that is required for ensuring long-run 
economic success. Similarly although rotational systems of immigration control may be 
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desirable, experience has shown that such systems are unsustainable, even at the national 
level. A system of permanent immigration is the only viable long term option for an 
immigration policy, and yet it is such permanent immigration that lies at the root of the 
concerns that make immigration such a politically sensitive issue across Europe. 
  
But it is clear that the debate about immigration is as much one about the social and political 
consequences as about the economic impact. As one author has noted, Europe's real 
perspective may be that "any immigration except of `patrials' constitutes an intolerable 
disturbance; since the objective is to reduce immigration and incorporation to a level as close 
as possible to zero, the prevailing situation is unacceptable, and a harbinger of worse things to 
come." (p. 77 Zolberg 1993). If this is true than the most likely outcome of the European 
immigration debate is the emergence of a `fortress Europe' against immigration from either 
developing countries or Eastern Europe, whatever the economic implications. 
 
Footnote 
 
1. I will also maintain the assumption of international capital mobility, thus avoiding any 
discussion as to the cost of capital dilution arising from immigration (eg. see Simon 1989, 
pp143-169) 
 
 
 31
Bibliography 
 
Altonji, J., and D. Card. 1991. The Effects of Immigration on the Labour Market Outcomes of 
Less-skilled Natives. In Immigration, Trade and the Labor Market, ed. J. Abowd and R. 
Freeman, 201-34. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
 
Baldwin-Edwards, M. 1991. Immigration after 1992. Policy and Politics 19 (3):199-211. 
 
Bean, F. D., B. L. Lowell, and L. J. Taylor. 1988. Undocumented Mexican Immigrants and the 
Earnings of Other Workers in the US. Demography 25:35-49. 
 
Borjas, G. J. 1983. The Substitutability of Black, Hispanic and White labour. Economic Inquiry 
(21):93-106. 
 
---. 1986. The Demographic Determinants of the Demand for Black Labour. In The Black Youth 
Employment Crisis. 1st ed., ed. R. B. Freeman, 191-230. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago. 
 
---. 1991. Immigration in the US Labor Market: 1940-80. American Economic Review 81:287-
91. 
 
---. 1994. The Economics of Immigration. Journal of Economic Literature 32 
(December):1667-1717. 
 
---. 1995. The Economic Benefits from Immigration. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (2):3-
22. N. 
 
Borjas, G. J., R. B. Freeman, and L. F. Katz. 1991. On the Labour Market Effects of 
Immigration and Trade. NBER Working Paper 3761, Cambridge (Mass.). 
 
Borjas, G. J., and V. Ramey. 1993. Foreign Competition, Market Power and Wage Inequality: 
Theory and Evidence. NBER Working Paper 4556. 
 
Brecher, R. B., and E. U. Choudhri. 1987. International Migration verses Foreign Investment in 
the Presence of Unemployment. Journal of International Economics 23:329-42. 
 
Butcher, K., and D. Card. 1991. Immigration and Wages: Evidence from the 1980s. American 
Economic Review 81 (2,May):292-96. 
 
Chiswick, B. 1991. Book Review. Journal of Economic Literature XXIX (June):627-28. 
 
---. 1994. The Performance of Immigrants in the United States Labour Market. In Economic 
Aspects of International Migration. 1st ed., ed. H. Giersch, 95-114. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
 
Collinson, S. 1993. Europe and International Migration. 1st ed. London: Pinter. 
 
Dearden, S. J. H. 1995. Minimum Wages and Wage Flexibility in the European Union. Journal 
of European Social Policy 5 (1):29-42. 
 
DeNew, J. P., and K. F. Zimmermann. 1994. Native Wage Impacts of Foreign Labor: A 
 32
Random Effects Panel Analysis. Journal of Population Economics 7:177-92. 
 
Ekburg, J. 1977. Long Term Effects of Immigration. Economy and Society 20 (1):3-22. 
 
Eurostat. 1990. Rapid Reports, Population and Social Conditions. No 4. 
 
Felderer, B. 1994. Can Immigration Policy Help tp Stabilise Social Security Systems? In 
Economic Aspects of International Migration. 1st ed., ed. H. Giersch, 197-248. Berlin: . 
 
Fischer, P. A., R. Martin, and T. Straubhaar. 1997. Development and Migration or Migration 
and Development? Book Chapter. 
 
Frey, W. 1994. The New White Flight. American Demographics 16:40-48. 
 
Friedberg, R. M., and J. Hunt. 1995. The Impact of Immigrants on Host Country Wages, 
Employment and Growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (2):23-44. 
 
Gang, I., and F. Rivera-Batiz. 1994. Labor Market Effects of Immigration in the United States 
and Europe: Substitution vs. Compliementarity. Journal of Population Economics 7:157-75. 
 
Garson, J. P. 1992. International Migration: Facts, Figures, Policies. OECD Observer 
(176,June):18-24. 
 
Garson, J. P., and A. Puymoyen. 1995. New Patterns of Migration. OECD Observer 
(192,February):8-12. 
 
Geddes, A. 1995. Immigrant and Ethnic Minorities and the EU's Democratic Deficit. Journal of 
Common Market Studies 33 (2,June):197-217. 
 
Greenwood, M. J., and J. M. McDowell. 1994. The National Labour Market Consequences of 
US Immigration. In Economic Aspects of International Migration. 1st ed., ed. H. Giersch, 155-
94. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
 
Grossman, J. 1982. The Substitutability of Natives and Immigrants in Production. Review of 
Economics and Statistics 64:596-603. 
 
Hansen, B. 1993. Immigration Policies in Fortress Europe. In Labor and an Integrated Europe. 
1st ed., ed. L. Ulman, 224-49. Washington: The Brookings Institute. 
 
Hunt, J. 1992. The Impact of 1962 Repatriates from Algeria on the French Labour Market. 
Industrial and Labour Relations Review 45:556-72. 
 
Ichino, A. 1993. The Economic Impact of Immigration on the Host Country. In Migration 
Policies in Europe and the United States, ed. G. Luciani, 145-62. : Kluwer Academic. 
 
International Organisation for Migration. 1991. Ninth Seminar on Migration: South-North 
Migration. International Migration 29. 
 
Krauss, M. B., and W. J. Baumol. 1979. Guest Workers and Income Transfer Programmes 
 33
financed by Host Governments. Kylos 32:36-46. 
 
 
Lalonde, R. J., and R. H. Topel. 1991. Labour Market Adjustments to Increased Immigration. In 
Immigration, Trade and the Labour Market, ed. R. Freeman and J. Abowd, 167-200. Chicago: 
University of Chicago. 
 
Layard, R., ed. 1992. East-West Migration: The Alternatives. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Luciani, G., ed. 1993. Migration Policies in Europe and the United States. London: Kluwer. 
 
Markusen, J. 1983. Factor Movements and Commodity Trade as Complements. Journal of 
International Economics 14:341-56. 
 
Molle, W., and A. V. Mourik. 1988. International Movements of Labour under Conditions of 
Economic Integration: The Case of Western Europe. Journal of Common Market Studies 26 
(3,March). 
 
Muhleisen, M., and K. F. Zimmermann. 1994. A Panel Anlysis of Job Changes and 
Unemployment. European Economic Review 38:793-801. 
 
OECD. 1985. The Labour Market Implications of International Migration in Selected OECD 
Countries. Employment Outlook. 
 
---. 1991. The Evolution of Fertility of Foreigners and Nationals. In Migration: the 
Demographic Aspects. Paris: OECD. 
 
Pischke, J.-S., and J. Velling. 1994. Wage and Employment Effects of Immigration to Germany 
: An Analysis Based on Local Markets. Working Paper MIT. 
 
Rakin, A., and E. Sadka. 1995. Assessing Migration: Wage Rigidity and Income Distribution. 
CEPR Discussion Paper 1091, London. 
 
Razin, A., and S. Efraim. 1994. Resisting Migration: Wage Rigidity and Income Distribution. 
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1091. 
 
Rivera-Batiz, F. L., S. L. Sechzer, and I. N. Gang. 1991. US Immigration Policy Reform in the 
1980s: A Preliminary Assessment. Praeger: New York. 
 
Simon, J. L. 1989. The Economic Consequences of Immigration. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 
---. 1994. On the Economic Consequences of Immigration: Lessons for Immigration Policy. In 
Economic Aspects of International Migration, ed. H. Giersch, 227-48. Berlin: . 
 
Stark, O. 1993. Migration of Labor. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Straubhaar, T. 1988. On the Economics of International Migration. Bern: Haupt. 
 
---. 1988. International Labour Migration within a Common Market: Some Aspects of EC 
 34
Experience. Journal of Common Market Studies 27 (1,September):45-62. 
 
Straubhaar, T., and K. F. Zimmermann. 1992. Towards a European Migration Policy. Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper 641. 
Taylor, L. J. 1987. Mexican Immigrants and the Wages and Unemployment Experience of 
Native Workers. Working Paper PRIP-UI-1, The Urban Institute. 
 
White, M., and Z. Liang. 1993. The Effect of Immigration on the Internal Migration of the 
Native-Born Population 1981-1990. Brown University, August. 
 
Winegarden, C. R., and L. B. Khor. 1991. Undocumented Immigration and Unemployment of 
US Youth and Minority Workers: Econometric Evidence. Review of Economics and Statistics 
73:105-12. 
 
Winkelmann, R., and K. F. Zimmermann. 1993. Aging, Migration and Labour Mobility. In 
Labour Markets in an Ageing Europe, ed. P. Johnson and K. F. Zimmermann, 255-83. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. N. 
 
Zimmermann, K. F. 1993. Industrial Restructuring, Unemployment and Migration. In Europe 
and Global Economic Interdependence, ed. L. Beckermans and L. Tsoukalis, 25-52. Bruges: 
College of Europe and Europe Inter University Press. N. 
 
---. 1994. European Migration: Push and Pull. Supplement to World Economic Review and 
World Bank Research Observer. 
 
Zimmermann, K. 1994. Some General Lessons for Europe's Migration Problem. In Economic 
Aspects of International Migration. 1st ed., ed. H. Giersch, 249-73. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
 
---. 1995. Tackling the European Migration Problem. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 
(2):45-62. 
 
Zolberg, A. R. 1993. Are the Industrial Countries Under Siege? In Migration Policies in Europe 
and the US. 1st ed., ed. G. Luciani, 127-45. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. 
 35
 
    
W/P            Ls 
        Ls2 
          j 
 
 
 
 
                      n       b  
         a   
         i                      k          c          e    
 
 
 
 
         d 
 
 
 
                   Ld 
 
 
          0           h      g          f           
         Employment  
 
         Fig.1.
 36
  
 
    
W/P            Ls 
        Ls2 
          j 
 
 
 
 
                         b              i 
         a   
                                                       
 
 
 
         d 
          
 
 
 
                   
                  Ld 
 
         0                                   
   g  m    Employment  
 
         Fig 2.
 37
         q  
W/P               Ls 
        Ls2 
         j 
 
 
 
                                           
                         b              r 
        a    
                                                       
 
 
 
           
         d                                                                                                     
                                                                                                        Ld2 
 
 
                   
         Ld 
 
         0                                    
   g  p    Employment  
 
         Fig 3.  
 38
W/P           
         y         
          
           Ls 
 
         v 
 
                                       
             
                                                       
 
 
         t                          u        x 
          
          
         Ld2 
 
 
                   
                   Ld        
 
                                                                               
 0            m                p 
         Employment  
 
      Fig.4 
 
 
 
 
